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Abstract
From 2015 to 2018, Cape Town, South Africa, was marked by fears of a water crisis 
in which the city’s taps threatened to run dry. We argue in this article that Cape Town’s 
crisis of water scarcity was a product of the convergence of ongoing contradictions in South 
African water governance as they came into contact with shifting infrastructural priorities 
associated with climate change. In its response to the possibility of a financial crisis brought 
on by reduced water consumption, the city withdrew the universal provision of free basic 
water (FBW) and reconfigured existing tariff structures. Both changes meant that the city 
moved further into commercialization and valuation practices in the context of restricted 
monetary flows. Based on an understanding of contemporary governance in South Africa as 
reflective of an often contradictory need to balance municipal budgets while also correcting 
for apartheid inequities, we argue that ongoing experiences of climate change are stretching 
existing municipal budgets in ways that threaten to deepen existing inequalities. Ultimately, 
we suggest that Cape Town’s crisis is critical for understanding how climate change is 
reconfiguring existing governance dynamics at a planetary scale, thus offering insights into 
what form urban climate change adaptation may take in the future.
Introduction: anticipating crisis
In late 2016, the City of Cape Town began to call attention to impending and 
increasingly worrying water scarcity––the result of a multi-year drought. The possibility 
of a citywide water crisis became a source of deepening anxiety for the city’s residents 
throughout 2016 and 2017. In November 2017, the city’s worries about water scarcity 
became acutely visible as dam levels dropped to around 20%. At this time, the city 
proposed the idea of Day Zero, a dramatic (and apocalyptic) framing of what was to 
come if the city’s taps were to run dry. Initially scheduled for 13 May 2018, Day Zero 
referred to the point at which the city’s dam levels would reach 13.5%, at which point a 
system of citywide enforced rationing would be put in place.1 Day Zero clearly showed 
just how serious the situation was, and located Cape Town’s experience of scarcity in a 
broader planetary geography of climate change and impending climate crisis. During 
the weeks that followed the city’s announcement of the apparent inevitability of 
rationing, residents were gripped by panic, a feeling heightened by the continued lack 
of rain and the city’s unremitting demand that residents use less water. In January 2018, 
the city coupled its warnings about the impending scarcity with the announcement of 
new water tariffs. These were supplemented by the rollout of Level 6B water restrictions 
1 While framed as an inevitability, Day Zero could more accurately be framed as a tool used by the City of Cape Town 
to encourage voluntary reductions in water consumption. The date was determined by a relatively simple metric of 
dividing existing water stores by daily consumption rates.
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the following month. Under Level 6B restrictions, residents were initially restricted to 
the use of 87 litres per person per day, a figure that was soon reduced to 50 litres. These 
restrictions remained in place for the next eight months, before being rolled back as the 
city’s crisis was averted through a combination of state efforts, voluntary reductions in 
water usage, and the onset of rain (see Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019; Ziervogel, 2019).
While other cities in South Africa have faced water crises in recent years, and 
cities throughout the global South face regularized water shortages (Peloso et al., 
2018), Cape Town’s experience took on global significance, seemingly owing to its 
size, its global visibility, and its robust water infrastructure system. The city received 
considerable attention as a potential harbinger of a future marked by climate change, 
prompting extensive coverage and analysis (see, for instance, Newkirk II, 2018). The 
possibility of the city running out of water in the near future appears to have passed, 
but Cape Town remains under general threat of scarcity owing to a combination of 
climatological and social factors. As part of a long-term strategy to reduce consumption, 
the city has attempted to lower its water usage through technical mechanisms and by 
encouraging reduced usage. In addition, it has modified existing tariff structures while 
pushing for the acceleration of augmentation schemes including desalination and 
groundwater access.
Many analysts throughout South Africa and beyond have sought to learn 
from the City of Cape Town’s experience and its management of the crisis. In this 
article, though, we wish to go beyond this uncritical celebration of Cape Town’s crisis 
management approach towards understanding the effects of the crisis on South African 
water governance more generally. This study forms part of a broader endeavour to better 
understand how preparations for a future marked by climate change and climate crisis 
are deepening present inequalities, particularly in cities of the global South. Cape Town’s 
crisis was, we argue, as much a financial crisis as an economic one, and responses to it 
were designed to ensure that the city’s model of managing water remained financially 
solvent. The crisis therefore needs to be understood as a momentary event but also as a 
result of patterns and processes that mark South African water governance in general. 
Our reading of crisis is therefore dialectical: the city’s crisis response reflected a new 
repertoire of responses but remained path-dependent because of its prioritization 
of engineered solutions within existing financial models. The consequence of this 
mobilization was the intensification of existing water governance arrangements 
already defined by inequality, coupled with an intensification of processes of water 
commercialization and valuation2 that threaten to limit equitable access to water into 
the future.
We are making this claim not with the intention of denying the existence 
of a drought, nor to dismiss the city’s notable reduction in water consumption (see 
Wolski, 2018; Muller, 2018, New et al., 2018), but in order to extend the debate beyond 
a technical discussion on crisis response towards an examination of the relationship 
between climate change, evolutions in water governance, infrastructural politics, 
municipal finance and sociospatial (in)equality. In doing so, we counter a dominant 
reading of the crisis as an unprecedented or unexpected occurrence linked to a changing 
climate. We contend instead that the appearance of crisis should be read as both rupture 
and continuation. Crisis reveals inherent contradictions within the existing water 
governance model that has contributed to a deepening of sociospatial inequality.
We respond to the possibility of a financial crisis brought on by reduced 
water charges owing to reduced consumption by arguing that the city undertook two 
fundamental changes into the nature of water governance in Cape Town. The first 
2 Commercialization entails the use of market-based instruments and institutions in resource governance. These 
include prioritizing efficiency, full cost accounting and cost–benefit analysis (Bakker, 2014: 465). Economic 
valuation entails the pricing of resources with the goal of inducing behavioural change––for example, reductions in 
resource consumption (ibid.).
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intervention was the withdrawal of the universal provision of the first 6 kl of free basic 
water (FBW), which had been available in South Africa since 2001. Since July 2017 
all water became chargeable within a stepped tariff structure, and FBW is applicable 
only to households that are able to declare themselves formally indigent. However, the 
formal registration process for this is arduous, especially for poor residents who are 
effectively required to prove their status. Secondly, the crisis has led to a reconfiguration 
of the existing tariff structures through the introduction of a revised water tariff that 
aims to correct for reduced water usage as a result of the drought. A consequence of the 
tariff restructuring has been that demand management and the FBW programme are 
now more deeply intertwined. Despite stated efforts to account for economic, equity and 
environmental considerations, the city has moved further towards commercialization 
and valuation practices in the context of restricted monetary flows.3 Both these changes 
have implications for equitable water access and distribution in the future.
In this article we focus on the relationships between climate change, municipal 
governance in a Southern city, and infrastructure, in order to contribute to scholarship 
on urban water governance in human geography and political ecology that recognizes 
the new uncertainty that climate change poses to water management for cities (Punjabi, 
2015: 1038). This is a critical domain of scholarly inquiry that extends past quantitative 
engagements with water provisioning to instead highlight the intimate relationships 
between water governance, spatial inequality, increasing climatic and fiscal uncertainty, 
and infrastructural politics (Jepson et al., 2017). We draw from contemporary literature 
on the material politics of climate change transitions and decarbonization experiments 
(see Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013; Cohen, 2016; Knuth, 2018) that highlight the 
degree to which climatic risk is deeply intertwined with financial and governmental risk. 
Cape Town’s crisis is critical for understanding how climate change is reconfiguring 
existing governance dynamics at a planetary scale, and offers insights into what form 
urban climate change adaptation may take in the future. In particular, by highlighting 
the contradictory logics between equitable infrastructural provisioning and the need 
to ensure that budgets are balanced, our research contributes to a growing body of 
literature focused on the political ecologies of the climate crisis and the difficult 
spatialities and materialities of a just transition in the context of structural inequality 
(Bigger and Millington, 2019; Elliott, 2019; Koslov, 2019; Ranganathan and Bratman, 
2019).
Our ultimate concern, and our contention as critical scholars of water 
governance, is that the climate crisis, and responses to it within the contexts of both 
municipal and provincial austerity, will further deepen existing inequalities while they 
are being articulated as part of purportedly new climatic and environmental dynamics. 
Shifting tariff structures and the alteration of existing arrangements of guaranteed 
water are suggestive of the kinds of banal yet critical ways in which the climate crisis 
is articulated within existing infrastructural and bureaucratic pathways. The crisis 
has accelerated existing tendencies in South African water governance, deepening the 
tensions between fiscal solvency and water redistribution goals, with consequences for 
future access. We argue that rather than resolve the contradictory dynamics of water 
governance in South Africa, the response to the 2015–2018 crisis displaced its effects to 
marginalized residents and on to the future. This has implications for our understanding 
of the politics of climate change adaptation, in South Africa and beyond.
Methodologically, this project draws on semi-structured interviews with 
decision makers and water activists in Cape Town, and on participant observation of 
meetings and events related to water crisis and political mobilization. Among those 
3 We note, too, that the crisis unlocked new possibilities for the expansion of desalination as a means of water 
provisioning. We intend to explore these dynamics in future work, but for now merely note that the expansion of 
desalination furthers and complements the arguments made in this article.
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interviewed were four mid-level and high-ranking officials within the City of Cape 
Town Water and Sanitation Department, including the Bulk Water Branch and the 
Water Demand Management Branch. Further interviews were held with respondents 
in the academic and civil-society sector who were actively engaged in mobilizing efforts 
during the drought response period. In addition to conducting interviews, both authors 
participated in events and meetings related to the crisis called by the City of Cape 
Town and civil-society actors, as well as a number of forums and presentations related 
to the city’s water crisis as it was happening. These included public and invited talks 
held by the political and official heads of the Informal Settlements, Water, and Waste 
Department of the City of Cape Town, and activist meetings convened by the Water 
Crisis Coalition and the African Water Commons Collective. Second author Suraya 
Scheba attended two of three water round table events convened during 2018 and 2019 
by South African water justice activists. In addition, our research drew from extensive 
discourse analysis of documents and media coverage related to the water crisis.
The infrastructures of climate crisis in an unequal city
The crisis of 2015 to 2018 emerged within and through an existing South 
African water governance model that is known for its contradictions. In South Africa, 
fundamental and intractable tensions hold water governance and its (un)sustainability 
in place.
 — Situating water governance in South Africa
In this article, we argue that the City of Cape Town’s responses to the water 
crisis, largely in the form of tariff restructuring and changes to the provision of FBW, 
should be read as a response to the threat of a financial crisis as much as a drought 
crisis. In making our argument we endeavour to offer both a historicized and a systemic 
reading of crisis emergence and management. We locate this argument in conversation 
with Gillian Hart’s characterization of the post-apartheid period as an ‘impossible 
terrain’ defined by a complex, contradictory and volatile relationship between scales of 
government, the need to address deep existing inequalities, and a simultaneous impetus 
to maintain fiscal solvency (Hart, 2014: 5). This struggle manifests itself most strongly at 
the municipal level, as official commitments to overcome poverty and inequality in the 
post-apartheid context sit uncomfortably with drives for fiscal austerity.
Most notably, local government has been tasked with being the principal 
agent of service delivery (McKinley, 2005; Dugard, 2010; Palmer et al., 2017), but has 
simultaneously been severely affected by a drastic reduction in grants and subsidies and 
a prohibition on operating budget deficits (McKinley, 2005; von Donk et al., 2008; Palmer 
et al., 2017). The scalar relations and constrained conditions informing the municipal 
terrain are evident from a recent report by the South African Water Caucus (SAWC) 
on the state of the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS). This report reveals 
that the national department is mired in institutional challenges, including financial 
mismanagement, escalating debt, capacity constraints and an ensuing deterioration 
of infrastructure owing to lack of maintenance and investment (SAWC, 2017). One 
consequence for local government under these conditions of fiscal austerity, coupled 
with the entrenchment of a service delivery mandate, has been that the public water 
supply network has experienced a vicious cycle of what Dugard (2016) terms the three 
lows: low investment, low service standards and low cost recovery.
A further consequence has been that many municipalities have been pushed 
towards the commercialization of basic services in an effort to generate revenue 
(McKinley, 2005, cited in Dugard, 2010: 183). The subsequent prioritization of 
commercialization has led to the use of market-based instruments and institutions in 
water governance, including full cost recovery. This has resulted in municipal utility 
services being ring-fenced and cost-reflective, that is, these services are being treated 
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like a business entity: they have to balance their budgets, and account for service 
revenue and costs. This situation has resulted in an emphasis on recovering the full cost 
of service delivery, which these services aim to achieve through municipal tariffs (COCT, 
2018a; 2018b).4 The City of Cape Town has identified the criteria for setting the tariffs, 
noting that a number of criteria need to be balanced, including financial, environmental, 
social and economic criteria. The city then states that the ‘aim is for the tariff to reflect 
the value of water and sanitation services to ensure sustainability and in a manner which 
provides transparency’ (COCT, 2018b: 4).
The need to manage municipal services at the local level in the context of a 
dysfunctional national entity and fiscal austerity has meant that infrastructural 
provisioning and inequality play out in complex, multiscalar ways. This argument 
builds on a longstanding tradition of critical scholarship examining post-apartheid 
water governance in South Africa (Hemson, 2000; McDonald and Pape, 2002; 
Smith, 2004; Loftus, 2005; McDonald and Ruiters, 2005; McKinley, 2005; Peters and 
Oldfield, 2005; Ruiters, 2007; Jaglin, 2008; Dugard, 2010; Narsiah and Ahmed, 2012; 
Yates and Harris, 2018; Angel and Loftus, 2019). We draw, in particular, from Yates 
and Harris (2018), who chart the co-evolutionary relation between neoliberal and 
human-rights-to-water-oriented transformations in Accra and Cape Town. The authors 
argue that these concepts ‘co-constitute each other discursively, practically, and in 
policy implementation’, resulting in a hybrid regulatory landscape (ibid.: 75). Critical 
scholarship on water governance in South Africa has been central in documenting the 
particular contradictory efforts to balance egalitarian service delivery with cost recovery, 
demonstrating the ways in which these competing criteria further intensify enduring 
inequality. These considerations are further complicated by the historical materiality 
of the South African city, which is marked by intense racialized inequality. As Gastrow 
(2018, npn) argues, ‘South Africa’s cities were never made for everyone’ (see also Rodina, 
2016).
We argue here that the crisis of 2015 to 2018 cannot be understood outside of this 
critical understanding of the already precarious and contradictory water governance 
system, which is defined by multiscalar fractures in conjunction with historical and 
persistent inequality. Instead, it is this existing system, characterized by increasingly 
constrained efforts to balance multiple criteria, that fused with the uncertainties 
of climate change to produce the crisis of 2015 to 2018. This reading of the ongoing 
‘impossibility’ of balancing competing governance commitments is supported by Hart, 
who argues:
Broadly speaking, local government has become the impossible terrain 
of official efforts to manage poverty and deprivation in a racially inflected 
capitalist society marked by massive inequalities and increasingly precarious 
livelihoods for the large majority of the population … While local government 
contradictions have their own specificities, they cannot be understood simply in 
local terms (Hart, 2014: 5).
Our specific aim with this article is to reflect on the ways in which the inherent 
contradictions within this ‘hybrid regulatory landscape’ contributed to the emergence 
of the crisis and the responses to it. Furthermore, we consider how these tensions are 
informing a reconfiguration of the landscape, with regressive consequences for future 
equity. Existing tendencies within South African water governance converged with the 
uncertainties and shifting infrastructural priorities associated with climate change to 
produce the localized crisis of 2015 to 2018. By adopting a historicized reading of the 
4 The domestic tariff is a stepped tariff, whereas the industrial, commercial and institutional (ICI) tariff is charged at 
a flat rate.
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crisis, we make the case that it was located within an existing path dependency that 
was guided by a contradictory governance model––one defined by ongoing tensions 
between ecological, economic and equity imperatives. These inherent contradictions 
can be regarded as informing the ongoing challenges that the majority face and which 
manifest themselves at the local level. This is a sustained crisis of unequal distribution 
that remains unnamed: ‘Poorer, usually Black South Africans, have been dealing with 
water scarcity for decades’ (Gastrow, 2018: npn). Ultimately, what is spectacular about 
the crisis from 2015 to 2018 is that it produced a rupture in status quo arrangements 
that otherwise secured the lifestyles of the wealthier residents of the city, resulting in 
widespread panic and governance shifts. At its heart, however, the apparent momentary 
emergence of the city’s water crisis cannot be understood outside of related multiscalar, 
historical and systemic infrastructural and financial constraints.
 — Urban infrastructures, urban political ecology and climate crisis
In our argument we draw on critical engagements with water governance 
that extend beyond South Africa. These studies have sought to transcend a technical 
or managerial debate about water governance and infrastructural provisioning 
through considerations of broader political, social, cultural and ecological domains 
(see Swyngedouw, 1996; 2004; Kaika, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2009; Anand, 2011; Linton 
and Budds, 2014; Ranganathan, 2014; Anand, 2017; Carse, 2017; Furlong and Kooy, 
2017; Truelove, 2019a). Often framed as a concern with the ‘hydrosocial cycle’, critical 
engagements with water governance significantly offer a nuanced reading of the insertion 
of water into market dynamics as part of a broader interest in the longstanding tradition 
of neoliberal natures within geography (see Smith, 2007; Castree; 2008; Bakker, 2010; 
Ouma et al., 2018). In this regard, the work of Karen Bakker (see, for example, Bakker, 
2010) has been instrumental, as it details the evolving conception and enrolment of 
water into capitalist markets from a precondition for commodity production towards 
later inclusions as a commodity in and of itself (Bakker, 2010; 2015; see also March, 2015; 
Williams, 2018). Bakker (2010) points out that much of this debate has unfolded as a 
public-versus-private binary. She argues for more nuanced reflection, arguing that water 
systems in much of the global South are not a public-versus-private binary but a hybrid 
form of provisioning (Sultana, 2015; see also Furlong and Kooy, 2017; Yates and Harris, 
2018). Recent scholarship has also highlighted two further trends, namely an increasing 
movement towards remunicipalization (Loftus, 2009; Lobina, 2017; McDonald, 2018) 
and the continued growth of private-sector activity in the water sector (Bakker, 2013; 
Karunananthan, 2019).
Our work draws on an extensive body of scholarship concerned with urban political 
ecology (Heynen et al., 2006; Heynen, 2014; Ranganathan and Balazs, 2015; Heynen, 2016; 
2018; Truelove, 2019b) and the politics of urban infrastructural systems (Larkin, 2013; 
Amin, 2014; Furlong, 2014). For von Schnitzler (2016), attention to the infrastructural 
can open up space for attending to politics that exist outside of normative articulations 
of where politics take place and by whom (see also Anand, 2017). A focus on what von 
Schnitzler––following Michell (2002) and Hecht (2012)––calls ‘techno-politics’ considers 
‘the ways in which political actions are embedded within technical forms and, conversely, 
the ways in which the technical shapes political questions’ (Schnitzler, 2016: 10; see also 
Larkin, 2008; Amin, 2014; Meehan, 2014). While the scholarship on infrastructure has 
become expansive within geography and urban studies in recent years, our attention is 
on the banal dynamics of budgeting for and governing of urban infrastructural systems in 
a context of shifting climatic and environmental dynamics at a number of scales. We are 
ultimately concerned with how infrastructures are rendered political in crisis contexts.
In contrast to more spectacular or apocalyptic framings of crisis events, our 
intervention in this article is aimed towards the banal, everyday dynamics of municipal 
governance. We highlight forms through which governance is being reconfigured by 
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new uncertainties borne from climate change, but note that these shifts are located 
within existing historicized dynamics. In contrast to the spectacular forms through 
which the water crisis in Cape Town was framed in the media and within governmental 
discourses, responses to the crisis have largely been operationalized in and through the 
everyday mechanics of governance, including drought-related task-team meetings, and 
concerns centred on fiscal solvency and restructured water tariffs (see COCT, 2019). 
Our aim with this article is therefore to push against apocalyptic imaginaries of the 
water crisis to focus on the mundane but nevertheless absolutely critical fiscal and 
governmental dynamics into which the climate crisis is inserted, with the intention of 
highlighting the path dependencies of existing approaches to water governance to show 
clearly that the emergence and management of the city’s crisis was produced in and 
through existing contradictions that mark the water sector.
Managing contradictions: water crisis and urban governance in Cape Town
South Africa has had a FBW policy since 2001, based on citizens’ right to water, 
as laid down in Section 27 of the South African Constitution and the Water Services Act 
No. 108 of 1997. This policy at present sets the minimum standard for FBW supply at 
25 litres per person per day, or 6 kl per household per month, within 200 m from the 
home (SERI, 2013; 2018; Rodina, 2016). Municipalities can decide how to apply the FBW 
policy––the only legal requirement being the guarantee of FBW to (registered) indigent 
households (SERI, 2018; Yates and Harris, 2018).5
The development of FBW demonstrates the complexities of balancing competing 
criteria for water provision, which include a commitment to water availability alongside 
a push towards commercialization. Municipalities have struggled to manage this 
requirement while simultaneously having to balance their budgets. As a result, they 
have created mechanisms for managing FBW allocations that include the deployment 
of technologically mediated forms of water management linked to debt recovery. 
Ruiters (2016) explains these apparently contradictory tendencies by arguing that the 
FBW policy was developed to be integral to cost recovery, and remains a feature of 
commercialization (Ruiters, 2016; see also Dugard, 2010; Dugard et al., 2017; Yates and 
Harris, 2018).6 Until recently, the City of Cape Town’s response to this policy and the 
constitutional guarantee of access to sufficient water had been through the universal 
provision of 6 kl of FBW per household per month, and 10.5 kl to registered indigent 
households per month (Kaiser and Macleod, 2018: 10). Residents’ experiences of water 
access are however, spatially variegated, with low-income townships in the city defined 
by lower levels of access, especially when considered qualitatively (see Dugard and 
Tissington, 2013; Hellberg, 2014; Rodina, 2016).
 — Remaking free basic water
In the context of the ongoing water crisis the universal FBW allocation was further 
eroded by and subsumed within a demand management approach (SERI, 2018; Yates and 
Harris, 2018). Municipal anxiety about demand management stretches as far back as 
2007, with the city drawing on experiences in Durban (during 1998) and Johannesburg 
(in 2001) in developing its ten-year water demand strategy.7 This strategy, designed to 
address cost recovery in service provision and to support water conservation, resulted 
5 Census data from 2011 revealed that 96.6% of households in Cape Town had access to piped water within 200 
meters of their home and 87% had access to water inside their dwelling or yard (COCT, 2012; Rodina, 2016).
6 Similarly, Bakker (2013) maintains that while apparently contradictory, arguments for the human right to water are 
not incompatible with movements towards commercialization, and monetary management of access. Instead, ‘the 
current international human rights regime is fully compatible with private property rights and private management’ 
(ibid.: 257). This analysis has prompted Bakker and other critical scholars to suggest that the call for the human 
right to water might be an insufficient tactic by anti-privatization activists (ibid., see also Bond, 2013).
7 Concerns centred on demand management were tied into the construction of the Berg River Dam, the recognition 
of limited opportunities for further construction of large-scale water infrastructure in the region, and earlier 
periods of water scarcity necessitating restriction (in 2000/2001 and 2004/2005).
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in the installation of water delivery technologies such as water management devices 
(WMDs) (Yates and Harris, 2018: 78). These devices are designed to restrict water access 
above the FBW quantity by automatically cutting off the water supply once the limit has 
been reached. The city started installing these as a credit control measure in 2007. An 
extension of the prepaid devices detailed by von Schnitzler (2017),8 these devices allow 
residents to receive 350 litres of FBW per household per day. Since 2007, around 250,000 
of these devices have been rolled out, largely in homes deemed indigent (Galvin, 2018).
As prepaid devices had largely been installed in indebted homes over the past 
decade, the installation of WMDs affected poor households disproportionately and have 
been widely contested in the post-apartheid period (Peters and Oldfield, 2005; Loftus, 
2005; von Schnitzler, 2008; Yates and Harris, 2018; Angel and Loftus, 2019). The devices 
were declared legal following the Mazibuko ruling,9 with the regular dynamics of device 
breakdown becoming a longstanding complaint of activists and residents. In a study 
conducted in 2012, the Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG) identified a number 
of failures in the implementation of these devices. EMG argued that the installation of 
WMDs gave rise to ‘a high incidence of technical failures leading to cut-offs, recurrent 
leaks leading to the allocated 350 litres per day running out quickly, a poor (or non-
existent) consultation process, and slow response times from the City when people 
reported problems’ (Wilson and Pereira, 2012). Moreover, these technologies could 
result in restricted water allocations, as household surveys often did not account for 
the number of household members nor for the number of households on a single plot. 
This reveals the complex, uneven landscape of overlapping infrastructural inequalities 
in the City of Cape Town, especially in a context where plots are often subdivided due 
to limited incomes.10
Despite historical resistance and critique of the conjoinment of FBW and 
demand management approaches (Yates and Harris, 2018), FBW became increasingly 
central to a demand management approach in the context of the water crisis. The 
number of devices that were being installed increased substantially to 2,000 per week 
as part of the city’s drought response, as the city ‘accelerated the rate at which we 
installed devices on all those indigent properties, and all those people who were also 
getting in debt who were not indigent properties’ (interview with an official of the Water 
Demand Management Branch, 19 August 2019). This expansion was based on a change 
in the nature of FBW, in particular the decision in July 2017 to make FBW entirely 
dependent on residents’ registration as indigent. Non-indigent households were from 
then on required to pay a charge for the first 6 kl unless they were declared indigent.11 
The reasoning for expanding the use of WMDs was related to concerns about balancing 
municipal revenue in the context of the drought situation. According to official sources, 
the imposition of increased water restrictions under drought conditions, from 1 January 
2018, resulted in significantly reduced revenue, with less than one quarter of the cost of 
water provision covered at the time (Kaiser and Macleod, 2018).
Under this approach, where access to FBW is no longer universal but instead 
dependent on need, indigent households receive their first 10.5 kl of water and 7.35 kl 
8 WMDs are often referred to as ‘prepaid meters in disguise’, since most of the arguments against prepaid meters 
seem to continue with them, including the limiting of allocation and the targeting of poor households.
9 This refers to the matter of the City of Johannesburg and Others v Mazibuko, which concerned two main issues 
related to the City of Johannesburg’s water services policy and provision: the reasonableness and sufficiency of 
the city’s FBW allocation of 6 kl per household per month, and the lawfulness of the city’s imposition of prepaid 
water meters on poverty-stricken households in Phiri, Soweto. The court ruled prepaid meters to be lawful.
10 Furthermore, this technologically mediated conjoinment of FBW, demand and debt management has led critical 
scholars to write about the paradox of FBW and cost recovery, showing its effect on increasing household debt and 
municipal financial loss (Peters and Oldfield, 2005). Loftus (2005) and von Schnitzler (2008) have argued for an 
understanding of these technologies as instruments of water commodification, which transform FBW into a free 
basic commodity. In her reflection on prepaid water meters, von Schnitzler (2008) argues that these can ‘be seen 
as the capillary ends of “cost recovery” that turns basic needs into new spheres of accumulation’ (ibid.: 901).
11 This charge was initially set at R4 per kilolitre for the first 6 kl, and rose to R33.24 per kilolitre during imposition of 
Level 6 restrictions.
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of sanitation free per month. However, the allocation of free water is linked to the 
installation of a WMD, conditional upon indigent registration and thus not voluntary. 
Hence, while claims of skewed WMD distribution are difficult to verify empirically, 
given limited data availability from the city administration, it is likely that WMDs 
were being disproportionately installed in poor households based on the relationships 
between debt, indigent status, infrastructure and implementation. Inequity here is 
likely to have been less a consequence of malicious design than a product of existing 
infrastructural inequality and failure, which interlink to determine how inequality 
is experienced materially (see Millington, 2018). However, regardless of intent, the 
effects are the same. Significantly, the narrow targeting of indigent households for FBW 
provision, coupled with the installation of a WMD, is reflective of a wider trend across 
South African cities (SERI, 2018: 9). According to a representative of the Western Cape 
Water Caucus (WCWC),12 ‘this is a move that we are seeing more and more … as the 
Water Caucus, it worries us because the universal free basic water … provides a safety 
net to those who don’t quite register as indigent or for some reason cannot’ (interview 
with representative of the WCWC, 2019).
The condition of registration as a requirement to receive free basic services 
is a worrying trend in a context of already intense inequality and can quickly become 
regressive, as it ‘will inevitably exclude poor households who could benefit … because 
several factors emerge that serve as a deterrent’ (SERI, 2018: 40). First, this narrow 
targeting approach fails to recognize that the registration process can be exclusionary, 
as households are required to prove their eligibility. This practice has historically proven 
to be burdensome, and to exclude many poor and vulnerable people as it presents ‘a 
significant cost to the poor and in instances where individuals are employed in the 
informal economy it becomes almost impossible’ (ibid.). Furthermore, the complexity 
of the process serves as a deterrent to many (Dugard, 2016). Finally, the definition of 
‘indigent’ is inconsistent across South Africa, resulting in the exclusion of many who are 
in need of benefits. The net effect is that indigent residents are under-representative of 
those in need of services (SERI, 2013; 2018; see also Yates and Harris, 2018). But, as the 
same WCWC representative as above notes: ‘To register as indigent you have to have an 
SA ID [South African identity document book], you have to jump through all of these 
hoops’ (interview with representative of the WCWC, 2018). An ID book or card is only 
one example of the ways in which indigent registration can be burdensome for members 
of low-income communities in particular.
By describing both the historical practices and the remaking of FBW as a 
fundamental crisis response, we seek to point out the extent to which this remaking 
threatens to further intensify existing urban inequalities by tying the crisis to a 
deepening of the relationship between FBW and demand management infrastructures 
and practices. The City of Cape Town’s crisis response has linked access to water 
explicitly to the requirement of indigent registration and the conditional installation of 
a WMD––itself already a controversial technological intervention. As Angel and Loftus 
note in their study of similar dynamics in Durban (see also Hellberg, 2014; Dugard, 
2016; Yates and Harris, 2018), ‘the development of indigent policies by individual 
municipalities from the late 2000s has meant that the state is not only able to decide 
what is and what isn’t a just distribution of water but also who is and who isn’t the 
deserving poor in relation to municipal service provision’ (Angel and Loftus, 2019: 208). 
Hence, instead of lauding Cape Town’s approach uncritically and extracting lessons 
from its drought response that other cities can learn from, we express concern about 
the future implications of the city’s regressive practices, particularly for the already 
marginalized residents of the city.
12 The WCWC is affiliated with the Coalition for Environmental Justice and the South African Water Caucus, which 
operates nationally.
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 — Changes in water tariffs, and valuing water
In July 2018, the City of Cape Town instituted revised water tariffs that consisted 
of three parts: a fixed service charge, restriction-related water costs that included 
charging for the first 6 kl of water for non-indigent households, and sanitation costs. The 
service charge is a newly introduced fixed charge for infrastructure to supply water to 
the home. While linked to temporary price increases following water restrictions, the 
new service charge was calculated based on the size of the connection to the property 
and will remain in place irrespective of restriction levels.
Restrictions imposed during the crisis resulted in a sharp rise in water costs 
within each of the stepped block tariffs.13 At Level 6, the cost of up to 6 kl was R33.24 
per kilolitre (Step 1 tariff ), followed by a cost of R52.90 per kilolitre up to 10.5 kl (Step 
2 tariff ), with costs rising further for Steps 3 and 4. As these costs were linked to 
water restrictions, they were reduced as dam levels rose and restriction levels were 
lowered, first back to Level 5 in October 2018 and then to Level 3 in December 2018 
(COCT, 2018). Despite this price reduction, it should be noted that the drought affected 
water valuation, as reflected in the water cost per kilolitre. When comparing Level 3 
restrictions in December 2016 to Level 3 restrictions in December 2018, for example, it 
becomes clear that the cost per kilolitre for the first 6 kl increased from R0 to R15.73 per 
kilolitre. When comparing the cost per kilolitre for the next block, from 6 kl to 10.5 kl, 
the cost increased from R16.54 per kilolitre to R22.38 per kilolitre. It is also significant 
that six tariff blocks were in place in December 2016, with those using in excess of 
50 kl per month paying R200.16 per kilolitre. Within the current tariff structure this 
changed to four tariff blocks, with a maximum charge of R69.76 per kilolitre for usage 
that exceeds 35 kl.
The reasoning for the tariff restructuring resulted from the need for 
municipalities to be financially sustainable in the context of reduced water usage. This 
concern to balance cost recovery with commitments to equitable access and water 
conservation is not new, and has been a consistent feature of the post-apartheid water 
governance model. The resulting contradictory hybrid framework has been widely 
contested by communities living on the receiving end of technologically mediated 
cost recovery practices and extensively documented by critical scholars over time. As 
we argued earlier in this article, this inherent historical tension contributed to the 
emergence of the Cape Town water crisis in the first place, as defined by the ‘impossible 
terrain’ documented by Hart (2014). However, the experience of crisis deepened these 
dynamics, as existing modes of cross-subsidization were altered by reduced water 
consumption across all spheres.
The financial resilience of the DWS within the City of Cape Town was precarious 
before the start of the drought owing to the limitations of the city’s financial model 
and historical underfunding (COCT, 2018b). As the May 2018 Water Outlook Report 
documents, historical underfunding contributed to the initial emergence of crisis 
conditions as a factor that extended beyond environmental considerations:
Water and Sanitation operations have been underfunded for a number of years 
due to approved tariffs being at levels insufficient to cover costs. This resulted 
in … concern regarding expenditure on asset renewal and maintenance, and 
postponing planned augmentation (COCT, 2018a: 11).
Furthermore, the September 2018 Water Outlook Report states: ‘Pressure to keep the 
tariff as low as possible has resulted in the business being underfunded for a number of 
years’ (COCT, 2018b: 5).
13 South African municipalities make use of block tariffs, which entail a rising tariff curve per block. These tariffs are 
designed to ensure access to water for low-income residents and support cross-subsidization. However, there has 
been extensive debate about the outcomes of this approach in practice (see Wilson and Pereira, 2012).
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Tariffs that are too low only make sense in the context of an underfunded 
water distribution system where cost recovery is mandatory. The drought exposed the 
limitations of this financial model and pushed it to the brink. During the drought, less 
revenue was generated as a result of imposed consumption restrictions and voluntary 
water usage reductions across the city. This occurred at the same time as demand 
management and augmentation infrastructure expenditure increased, while the fixed 
costs of infrastructural provisioning remained the same. This placed strain on the DWS 
as a trading service and required the city to re-prioritize its overall expenditure to 
provide additional support (COCT, 2018a; 2018b; Kaiser and Macleod, 2018; Ziervogel, 
2019).
City documentation clearly indicates that the crisis responses were informed 
by a concern with financial sustainability in the context of shifting climatic terrain, 
stating that the ‘current tariff structure is not resilient to drought’ (COCT, 2018a: 11). 
This can be attributed to the fact that water tariffs need to cover the full long-term 
cost of delivering the service, excluding capital and operating subsidies for free basic 
services. For this reason, cost recovery is vulnerable to changes in consumption patterns, 
while it still needs to account for fixed costs and the costs of providing infrastructure 
(COCT, 2018a; 2018b). In their detailed explanation of the reasoning for the tariff 
restructuring, Kaiser and Macleod state: ‘While pricing is not always the most effective 
mechanism to entrench the concept of value, it was a necessary move to establish 
financial sustainability for the Water and Sanitation Department as a utility service’ 
(Kaiser and Macleod, 2018: 10–11). Furthermore, in their future vision for city resilience 
in respect of water availability and finance, the authors explain: ‘As a ring-fenced, cost-
reflective service, the tariff structure needs to cover costs to ensure continuous service 
provision’ (ibid.: 11).
Critically, the drought experience resulted in reduced consumption levels 
throughout the city, but in particular among wealthier, higher-volume consumers 
whose consumption habits typically served to cross-subsidize the usage of the poor (a 
standard and longstanding dynamic of South African infrastructural governance). One 
respondent noted that:
normally we would have progressive step tariffs … The theory behind 
that, obviously, would be that you’re utilizing the rich people to pay for the 
poorer people. So it’s part of your cross-subsidization. What the drought 
has done is the people that were utilizing in Step 2––sorry, Step 3 and 4 [of 
the tariff blocks]––is no longer doing that … the consumption in those steps 
has evaporated. Pun intended. What that meant is that your whole cross-
subsidization model was sort-of pulled away from you because you no longer 
have those high volumes in those steps to actually do the cross-subsidization. 
So what happens is that you can only now go to where you know there is 
certainty. Okay, so where normally you would have had quite low tariffs at the 
bottom end and high tariffs at the high end, because there’s none left, you 
need to immediately start bringing your Step 1 and 2 much closer to your 
actual cost of what it costs you to produce that. No more cross-subsidization. 
Now, obviously, that immediately has impact for your poorer people. And the 
people that previously paid more, you know, they can probably absorb it, but 
your lower middle class is also struggling. So, that whole thing is something 
that has been pushing on us. Because you have to make that change, because 
what you need to realize is we need to run a sustainable service … So I think 
what I’m trying to say to you is that the drought has significant impacts on your 
financial model. It had an impact on the cross-subsidization model. And it had a 
very big impact on your base information (interview with representative of the 
DWS’s Financial and Commercial Sector, 25 September 2019).
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More recently, the city sought to reduce the restriction levels, and Level 3 restrictions 
were instituted in December 2018. However, consumption patterns have not changed 
substantially relative to the restricted usage of 500 Ml per day during peak Level 6 
restrictions. Local residents have thus highlighted the disjuncture between water 
demand management and the need to properly fund water services through tariff 
restructuring. A poster on a Facebook group that emerged during the crisis noted:
Unless we use more water we can expect to pay further levies instead. Thus we 
will forever pay more for water (than necessary) and essentially therefore pay for 
not using water … all the while when we currently have abundant supply … Our 
current relationship with water, though it saved us from a Day Zero crisis, is now 
problematic. We need to consume more in times of relative plenty (and stabilize 
COCT water revenues) otherwise we will simply keep using less and less while 
having further levies introduced and relatively full dams in summer … nice to 
look at and photograph perhaps, but hardly a sensible relationship to have with 
stored water (Watershedding Facebook group, December 2018).
The tariff restructuring reflects the evolving management of tension between economic, 
equity and environmental considerations. Restructuring, which can be attributed the 
limitations of the existing water finance model (see Ziervogel, 2018), is defined by 
a ring-fenced water department of a municipality that is required ‘to cover costs to 
ensure continuous service provision’ (Kaiser and Macleod, 2018: 11). It is the result 
of tensions that are a feature of historical continuity and have been reconfigured in 
response to the intensification of the contradictions in the context of the drought crisis. 
The emergence of tariff restructuring is therefore an effort to avert a funding crisis. 
However, it has not led to a fundamental redesigning of the model (ibid.: 10–11). Instead, 
in our view, the South African water governance regime is defined by internal tensions 
and contradictions, most notably a concern to manage a commitment to equitable 
distribution while simultaneously needing to ensure full cost recovery. The crisis 
management approach thus exposes and engenders these contradictions, resulting in a 
negotiated outcome that further prioritizes economic over equity commitments. This is 
evident from the reconfigured and binding relationship between FBW, debt and demand 
management, WMDs, indigent registration and tariff restructuring.
 — Crisis, change and stasis
By drawing these arguments together, we have attempted to advance an 
understanding of Cape Town’s water crisis as historically situated, relational and 
systemic. We began by arguing that post-apartheid water governance is defined by 
multiscalar infrastructural and financial constraints. These constraints have resulted in 
an ‘impossible terrain’ (Hart, 2014) defined by contradictory commitments to equitable 
water provision and water marketization. One consequence of this ‘impossible terrain’ 
is a spiral of infrastructure underinvestment. We therefore argue that these existing 
tendencies and tensions within the system fused with the uncertainties presented by 
climate change to contribute to the crisis of 2015 to 2018. Reading the crisis in this way 
allows us to acknowledge the temporality of the crisis, as it is located within existing 
path dependencies. In this sense, the crisis can be understood as a systemic rupture that 
reveals the contingency and ongoing contradictions inherent to the system.
The City of Cape Town’s crisis interventions were concerned with navigating 
drought risk, but its actions unfolded in relation to ongoing concerns centred on fiscal 
austerity and systemic resilience. Thus, drought resilience was from the outset deeply 
intertwined with existing concerns to ensure financial resilience. In and through 
this complex navigation, the promoted interventions led to an intensification of the 
marketization of water and an erosion of equity considerations. Therefore, these 
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interventions need to be understood as a continuation and deepening of an existing path 
dependency, defined by commercialization and valuation tendencies in the context of 
fiscal austerity. Furthermore, the city’s management of the water crisis clearly showed 
that there are no distinctions between a financial and an ecological crisis (see Moore, 
2011; 2015). In other words, these crises are entirely relational.
We understand crisis to be a general condition of South African water governance. 
It is a systemic crisis that exists in ‘normal’ times too, and results in differentiated 
experiences of water access in general (see Rodina, 2016). What the named water 
crisis (Day Zero) did was disrupt the existing inequity of the system by limiting the 
access of those who are otherwise privileged. This meant that the broader structural 
crisis of water governance was generalized as a result of an environmental shock. 
This named crisis was then resolved through changes to the city’s tariff structures 
and the renegotiation of the FBW policy, disproportionately affecting the city’s most 
marginalized residents.
The crisis and the anticipatory apocalyptic framings of Day Zero emerged in and 
through historicized dynamics in spite of the oft-repeated refrain that ‘doing nothing 
is simply not an option’ (COCT, 2019). As a result, future water management outcomes 
remain trapped in past contradictions and may therefore result in what Anand et al. 
(2018: 27–28) call ‘the ruins of the future’. This form of ruination is arguably already 
materializing through infrastructural incompleteness and breakdown and the deepening 
of marginalization as a result of the restructuring outlined in this article. Hence, by 
tracing interventions and their consequences, we argue that instead of resolving the 
existing contradictions in the system, the response has simply shifted the problem. 
We suggest that this displacement has taken place in at least two senses. The first is 
a geographic and social displacement, which has led to a deepening of the crisis for 
the already marginalized residents of the city through the erosion of FBW and tariff 
restructuring, indigent registration requirements, and WMD installation. Consequently, 
historical inequity has been merged with climatic uncertainty to create forms of 
continuing and intensifying eco-apartheid (Cohen, 2018). The second is a temporal 
displacement, which has led to a shifting of the crisis towards a future moment, because 
the root causes of the crisis remain unresolved and have been contained only temporarily.
Conclusion: water crisis, anticipation, climate justice
The City of Cape Town’s crisis management response, which attempted to 
manage demand through revised FBW provision, the installation of WMDs, and the 
restructuring of tariffs, suggests a degree of both stasis and change. In this article, we 
considered how Cape Town’s water crisis marked a point of discontinuity and continuity 
in Cape Town’s water governance, and we cautioned against a framing of the city as 
having both experienced and surpassed the crisis. While the crisis resulted in the 
governance reconfigurations that were highlighted here, we argue that these changes are 
located within a historical path dependency that is influenced by the financial model the 
water sector uses and by the contradictory commitments of equity, water conservation 
and economic performance. In this sense, the Cape Town crisis management response 
can be read by paying attention to the ‘contradictions, limits and constraints’ within the 
sector (Yates and Harris, 2018). In Cape Town, the infrastructure–finance nexus has 
emerged as key to water delivery (Palmer et al., 2017).
The water management strategies that the city instituted in the context of 
the water crisis have served to reinforce the logics of commercialization and water 
valuation, threatening to deepen inequality. Tensions between the demands for financial 
solvency and for reduced water usage emerged in the form of crisis and led to responses 
that are concerned not only with returning water access to pre-crisis conditions but 
also with finding ways to manage existing tensions that have been heightened by 
the city’s experience of crisis. Our concern is that equity considerations have largely 
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been subsumed within the commitment to financial sustainability, which has been 
complicated further by the threat of environmental crisis. The city’ response to the crisis 
can be understood through changes to the regulatory and infrastructural landscape 
that served to displace these contradictions through intensified commercialization and 
water valuation.
While we acknowledge that the City of Cape Town has to walk a tightrope to 
balance these demands, we argue that without fundamental restructuring in distribution 
practices and the financial model underpinning this, inequality will deepen. The city 
performed well in many respects, especially by avoiding Day Zero, not committing to 
larger-scale desalination (for now), and encouraging substantial buy-in for consumption 
reduction. However, co-existing tensions around budgeting, inequality and climate 
change reflect complex relations. If these are to be managed in ways that support more 
just futures, a more profound shift in the fundamental logics that are shaping water 
governance will be required. The fundamental tension between economic and equity 
considerations that inform the current water distribution model are further complicated 
by environmental imperatives and increasing pressures to manage changing climatic 
conditions. We believe that equity considerations have been subsumed under economic 
considerations as a result of the city having to operate within an increasingly constrained 
budget. This has been the case historically, and has informed the city’s commercialization 
approach. However, the drought has intensified the unsustainability of the current model. 
Surpassing this existing dynamic requires fundamental rethinking and action.
Ultimately, the current dynamics are indicative of the forms and pathways 
through which climate crisis is materializing. Climate crisis is generating new dynamics 
of governance (see Paprocki, 2018), and these are occurring in and through relationships 
with existing arrangements. Cape Town’s experience with scarcity appears to suggest 
that climate change will not lead to more equitable distributions of existing urban 
services, but rather to the deepening of existing inequalities. Cape Town’s experience 
also demonstrates how the deepening of inequality in the face of climate change is by 
no means inevitable. Rather, it is mediated and produced through specific decisions and 
responses. In this sense, Cape Town’s experience with scarcity highlights the need for 
political mobilizations that prioritize democratic and equitable infrastructures in the 
future. While we acknowledge the energy and effort that went into the city’s response to 
the water crisis from 2015 to 2018, we strongly caution against treating these practices as 
strictly exemplary. Instead, we have sought to show that the ‘crisis of the status quo’ was 
overcome by adopting measures that displaced the crisis disproportionately towards 
the already marginalized residents of the city. The challenge and the central question 
emerging from of this article, then, is how climate change and associated climate politics 
might be articulated in ways that lead towards greater future equity.
Nate Millington, Department of Geography and Manchester Urban Institute, 
School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, 
Manchester, M13 9PL, UK, nate.millington@manchester.ac.uk
Suraya Scheba, Department of Environmental and Geographical Science, University 
of Cape Town, Environmental and Geographical Sciences Building, South Lane, Upper 
Campus, Rondebosch, 7701 Cape Town, South Africa, suraya.scheba@uct.ac.za
References
Amin, A. (2014) Lively infrastructure. Theory, Culture & 
Society 31.7/8, 137–61.
Anand, N. (2011) Pressure: the politechnics of water supply 
in Mumbai. Cultural Anthropology 26.4, 542–64.
Anand, N. (2017) Hydraulic city: water and the 
infrastructures of citizenship in Mumbai. Duke 
University Press, Durham, NC.
Anand, N., A. Gupta and H. Appel (eds.) (2018) The promise 
of infrastructure. Duke University Press, Durham, NC.
Angel, J. and A. Loftus (2019) With-against-and-beyond the 
human right to water. Geoforum 98 (January), 206–13.
Bakker, K. (2010) Privatizing water: governance failure and 
the world’s urban water crisis. Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, NY.
MILLINGTON AND SCHEBA 130
Bakker, K. (2013) Neoliberal versus postneoliberal water: 
geographies of privatization and resistance. Annals 
of the Association of American Geographers 103.2, 
253–60.
Bakker, K. (2014) The business of water: market 
environmentalism in the water sector. Annual Review 
of Environment and Resources 39 (October), 469–94.
Bakker, K. (2015) Neoliberalization of nature. In T. Perreault, 
G. Bridge and J. McCarthy (eds.), The Routledge 
handbook of political ecology, Routledge, Abingdon 
and New York, NY.
Bigger, P. and N. Millington (2019) Getting soaked? Climate 
crisis, adaptation finance, and racialized austerity. 
Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space.  
https://doi.org/10.1177/2514848619876539
Bond, P. (2013) The right to the city and the eco-social 
commoning of water: discursive and political lessons 
from South Africa. In F. Sultana and A. Loftus (eds.), The 
right to water, Routledge, London.
Bulkeley, H. and V. Castán Broto (2013) Government by 
experiment? Global cities and the governing of 
climate change. Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 38.3, 361–75.
Carse, A. (2017) An infrastructural event: making sense of 
Panama’s drought. Water Alternatives 10.3, 888–909.
Castree, N. (2008) Neoliberalising nature: processes, 
effects, and evaluations. Environment and Planning A: 
Economy and Space 40.1, 153–73.
COCT (City of Cape Town) (2012) Trends and 
change––10 years: Census 2001–Census 2011. City of 
Cape Town, Cape Town.
COCT (City of Cape Town) (2018a) Water outlook report, 




(accessed 5 February 2020).
COCT (City of Cape Town) (2018b) Water outlook report, 
September 2018 [WWW document]. URL https://
www.greencape.co.za/assets/Uploads/Water-Outlook-
September-2018.pdf (accessed 5 February 2020).
COCT (City of Cape Town) (2019) Cape Town water strategy, 
draft for comment, January 2019 [WWW document]. 
URL http://www.capetown.gov.za/City-Connect/ 
Have-your-say/Issues-open-for-public-comment/ 
draft-cape-town-water-strategy (accessed 5 February 
2020).
Cohen, D.A. (2016) The rationed city: the politics of water, 
housing, and land use in drought-parched São Paulo. 
Public Culture 28.2(79), 261–89.
Cohen, D.A. (2018) Water crisis and eco-apartheid in São 
Paulo: beyond naive optimism about climate-linked 
disasters. International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research ‘Spotlight On’ series: Parched cities, parched 
citizens [WWW document]. URL https://www.ijurr.org/
spotlight-on/parched-cities-parched-citizens/water-
crisis-and-eco-apartheid-in-sao-paulo-beyond-naive-
optimism-about-climate-linked-disasters/ (accessed 20 
January 2020).
Dugard, J. (2010) Can human rights transcend the 
commercialization of water in South Africa? Soweto’s 
legal fight for an equitable water policy. Review of 
Radical Political Economics 42.2, 175–94.
Dugard, J. (2016) The right to water in South Africa. In 
Socio-economic rights: progressive realisation?, 
Foundation for Human Rights, Johannesburg.
Dugard, J. and K. Tissington (2013) Civil society and protest 
in South Africa: a view from 2012. In State of Civil 
Society 2013––Creating an Enabling Environment, 
CIVICUS, World Alliance for Citizen Participation, 
Johannesburg.
Dugard, J., M. Langford and E. Anderson (2017) 
Determining progress on access to water and 
sanitation. In M. Langford and A.F. Russell (eds.), The 
human right to water: theory, practice and prospects, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Elliott, R. (2019) ‘Scarier than another storm’: values at risk 
in the mapping and insuring of US floodplains. The 
British Journal of Sociology 70.3, 1067–90.
Enqvist, J.P. and G. Ziervogel (2019) Water governance 
and justice in Cape Town: an overview. Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water 6.4 (July/August). 
https://doi.org/10.1002/wat2.1354
Furlong, K. (2014) STS beyond the ‘modern infrastructure 
ideal’: extending theory by engaging with 
infrastructure challenges in the South. Technology in 
Society 38 (August), 139–47.
Furlong, K. and M. Kooy (2017) Worlding water supply: 
thinking beyond the network in Jakarta. International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 41.6, 888–903.
Galvin, M. (2018) Bold steps are needed toward a ‘new 
normal’ that allocates water fairly in South Africa. The 
Conversation 6 March [WWW document]. URL https://
theconversation.com/bold-steps-are-needed-toward-
a-new-normal-that-allocates-water-fairly-in-south-
africa-92191 (accessed 20 January 2020).
Gastrow, C. (2018) Cape Town’s water woes are the norm 
for the city’s black residents. In Africa’s a country 
[WWW document]. URL https://africasacountry.
com/2018/02/cape-towns-water-woes-are-the-norm-
for-the-citys-black-residents (accessed 6 February 
2020).
Hart, G.P. (2014) Rethinking the South African crisis: 
nationalism, populism, hegemony. University of 
Georgia Press, Athens, GA.
Hecht, G. (2012) Being nuclear: Africans and the global 
uranium trade. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Hemson, D. (2000) Policy and practice in water and 
sanitation. Indicator South Africa 17.4, 48–53.
Hellberg, S. (2014) Water, life and politics: exploring the 
contested case of eThekwini municipality through 
a governmentality lens. Geoforum 56 (September), 
226–36.
Heynen, N. (2014) Urban political ecology I: the urban 
century. Progress in Human Geography 38.4, 598–604.
Heynen, N. (2016) Urban political ecology II: the abolitionist 
century. Progress in Human Geography 40.6, 839–45.
Heynen, N. (2018) Urban political ecology III: the feminist 
and queer century. Progress in Human Geography 42.3, 
446–52.
Heynen, N., M. Kaika and E. Swyngedouw (eds.) (2006) In 
the nature of cities: urban political ecology and the 
politics of urban metabolism. Routledge, Abingdon 
and New York, NY.
Jaglin, S. (2008) Differentiating networked services in Cape 
Town: echoes of splintering urbanism? Geoforum 39.6, 
1897–906.
Jepson, W., J. Budds, L. Eichelberger, L. Harris, E. Norman, 
K. O’Reilly, A. Pearson, S. Shah, J. Shinn, C. Staddon 
and J. Stoler (2017) Advancing human capabilities for 
water security: a relational approach. Water Security 1 
(July), 46–52.
Kaika, M. (2005) City of flows: modernity, nature, and the 
city. Psychology Press, London.
Kaiser, G. and N. Macleod (2018) Cape Town––where we’ve 
been and where we want to go. Civil Engineering 
(October), 8–12.
Karunananthan, M. (2019) Can the human right to water 
disrupt neoliberal water policies in the era of 
corporate policy-making? Geoforum 98 (August), 
244–53.
Knuth, S. (2018) Cities and planetary repair: the problem 
with climate retrofitting. Environment and Planning A: 
Economy and Space 51.2, 487–504.
Koslov, L. (2019) Avoiding climate change: ‘agnostic 
adaptation’ and the politics of public silence. Annals 
of the American Association of Geographers 109.2, 
568–80.
Larkin, B. (2008) Signal and noise: media, infrastructure, 
and urban culture in Nigeria. Duke University Press, 
Durham, NC.
Larkin, B. (2013) The politics and poetics of infrastructure. 
Annual Review of Anthropology 42 (October), 327–43.
Linton, J., and J. Budds (2014) The hydrosocial cycle: 
defining and mobilizing a relational-dialectical 
approach to water. Geoforum 57 (November), 170–80.
Lobina, E. (2017) Water remunicipalisation: between 
pendulum swings and paradigm advocacy. In S. Bell, 
DAY ZERO AND THE INFRASTRUCTURES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 131
A. Allen, P. Hofmann and T-H. Teh (eds.), Urban water 
trajectories, Springer, Cham.
Loftus, A. (2005) Free water as commodity: the paradoxes 
of Durban’s water service transformations. In 
D. McDonald and G. Ruiters (eds.), The age of 
commodity: water privatization in southern Africa, 
Routledge, Abingdon and New York, NY.
Loftus, A. (2009) Rethinking political ecologies of water. 
Third World Quarterly 30.5, 953–68.
March, H. (2015) The politics, geography, and economics of 
desalination: a critical review. Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Water 2.3 (May/June), 231–43. https://doi.
org/10.1002/wat2.1073
McDonald, D.A. (2018) Remunicipalization: the future of 
water services? Geoforum 91 (May), 47–56.
McDonald, D.A. and J. Pape (2002) Cost recovery and 
the crisis of service delivery in South Africa. HSRC 
Publishers, Pretoria.
McDonald, D.A. and G. Ruiters (eds.) (2005) The age of 
commodity: water privatization in southern Africa. 
Earthscan, London.
McKinley, D.T. (2005) The struggle against water 
privatisation in South Africa. In Reclaiming public 
water: achievements, struggles and visions from 
around the world, Transnational Institute, Corporate 
Europe Observatory, Amsterdam.
Meehan, K.M. (2014) Tool-power: water infrastructure as 
wellsprings of state power. Geoforum 57 (November), 
215–24.
Millington, N. (2018) Producing water scarcity in São Paulo, 
Brazil: the 2014–2015 water crisis and the binding 
politics of infrastructure. Political Geography 65 (July), 
26–34.
Mitchell, T. (2002) Rule of experts: Egypt, techno-politics, 
modernity. University of California Press, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, CA.
Moore, J.W. (2011) Wall Street is a way of organizing nature: 
an interview with Jason W. Moore. Upping the Anti: A 
Journal of Theory and Action 12, npn.
Moore, J.W. (2015) Capitalism in the web of life: ecology 
and the accumulation of capital. Verso Books, New 
York, NY.
Muller, M. (2018) Cape Town’s drought: don’t blame climate 
change. Nature 6 July [WWW document]. URL https://
www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05649-1 
(accessed 22 January 2020).
Narsiah, S. and W. Ahmed (2012) The neoliberalization of 
the water and energy sectors in South Africa and India. 
Journal of Asian and African Studies 47.6, 679–94.
New, M., F. Otto and P. Wolski (2018) Global warming has 
already raised the risk of more severe droughts in 
Cape Town. The Conversation 19 December [WWW 
document]. URL https://theconversation.com/global-
warming-has-already-raised-the-risk-of-more-severe-
droughts-in-cape-town-107625 (accessed 22 January 
2020).
Newkirk II, V.R. (2018) Cape Town is an omen: climate 
change is going to revolutionize politics in cities 
across the world. The Atlantic 11 September [WWW 
document]. URL https://www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2018/09/cape-south-south-africa-water-
crisis/569317/ (accessed 22 January 2020).
Ouma, S., L. Johnson and P. Bigger (2018) Rethinking the 
financialization of ‘nature’. Environment and Planning 
A: Economy and Space 50.3, 500–11.
Palmer, I., N. Moodley and S. Parnell (2017) Building a 
capable state: service delivery in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Zed Books, London.
Paprocki, K. (2018) All that is solid melts into the bay: 
anticipatory ruination and climate change adaptation. 
Antipode 51.1, 295–315.
Peloso, M., C. Morinville and L.M. Harris (2018) Water 
scarcity beyond crisis: spotlight on Accra. International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research ‘Spotlight 
On’ series: Parched cities, parched citizens [WWW 
document]. URL http://www.ijurr.org/spotlight-on/
parched-cities-parched-citizens/water-scarcity-
beyond-crisis-spotlight-on-accra/ (accessed 22 
January 2020).
Peters, K. and S. Oldfield (2005) The paradox of ‘free basic 
water’ and cost recovery in Grabouw: increasing 
household debt and municipal financial loss. Urban 
Forum 16.4, 313–35.
Punjabi, B. (2015) Debate on Karen Bakker’s Privatizing 
Water. International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 39.5, 1037–39.
Ranganathan, M. (2014) Paying for pipes, claiming 
citizenship: political agency and water reforms at the 
urban periphery. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 38.2, 590–608.
Ranganathan, M. and C. Balazs (2015) Water marginalization 
at the urban fringe: environmental justice and urban 
political ecology across the North–South divide. Urban 
Geography 36.3, 403–23.
Ranganathan, M. and E. Bratman (2019) From urban 
resilience to abolitionist climate justice in Washington, 
DC. Antipode. https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12555
Rodina, L. (2016) Human right to water in Khayelitsha, South 
Africa––lessons from a ‘lived experiences’ perspective. 
Geoforum 72 (June), 58–66.
Ruiters, G. (2007) Contradictions in municipal services 
in contemporary South Africa: disciplinary 
commodification and self-disconnections. Critical 
Social Policy 27.4, 487–508.
Ruiters, G. (2016) The moving line between state 
benevolence and control: municipal indigent 
programmes in South Africa. Journal of Asian and 
African Studies 53.2, 169–86.
SAWC (South African Water Caucus) (2017) Report on 
the state of the Department of Water and Sanitation 
[WWW document]. URL https://www.fse.org.za/
Downloads/SAWCStateofDWSReport.pdf (accessed 5 
February 2020).
SERI (Socio-Economic Rights Institute) (2013) Targeting 
the poor: an analysis of free basic services (FBS) 
and municipal indigent policies in South Africa. SERI, 
Johannesburg.
SERI (Socio-Economic Rights Institute) (2018) Turning off 
the tap: discontinuing universal access to free basic 
water in the City of Johannesburg. SERI, Johannesburg.
Smith, L. (2004) The murky waters of the second wave of 
neoliberalism: corporatization as a service delivery 
model in Cape Town. Geoforum 35.3, 375–93.
Smith, N. (2007) Nature as accumulation strategy. Socialist 
Register 16 (March), 16–36.
Sultana, F. (2015) Governance failures in neoliberal times. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 
30.5, 1047–48.
Swyngedouw, E. (1996) The city as a hybrid: on nature, 
society and cyborg urbanization. Capitalism Nature 
Socialism 7.2, 65–80.
Swyngedouw, E. (2004) Social power and the urbanization 
of water: flows of power. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford.
Swyngedouw, E. (2009) The political economy and 
political ecology of the hydro-social cycle. Journal 
of Contemporary Water Research & Education 142.1, 
56–60.
Truelove, Y. (2019a) Gray zones: the everyday practices 
and governance of water beyond the network. Annals 
of the American Association of Geographers 109.6, 
1758–74.
Truelove, Y. (2019b) Rethinking water insecurity, inequality 
and infrastructure through an embodied urban 
political ecology. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: 
Water 6.3 (May/June). https://doi.org/10.1002/
wat2.1342
van Donk, M. (ed.) (2008) Consolidating developmental 
local government: lessons from the South African 
experience. Juta, Cape Town.
von Schnitzler, A. (2008) Citizenship prepaid: water, 
calculability, and techno-politics in South Africa. 
Journal of Southern African Studies 34.4, 899–917.
von Schnitzler, A. (2016) Democracy’s infrastructure: 
techno-politics and protest after apartheid. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Williams, J. (2018) Assembling the water factory: seawater 
desalination and the techno-politics of water 
MILLINGTON AND SCHEBA 132
privatisation in the San Diego–Tijuana metropolitan 
region. Geoforum 93 (July), 32–39.
Wilson, J. and T. Pereira (2012) Water demand 
management’s shadow side: tackling inequality 
and scarcity of water provision in Cape Town. EMG 
Water and Climate Change Research Series. Report 7, 
Environmental Monitoring Group, Cape Town.
Wolski, P. (2018) How severe is the drought? An analysis 
of the latest data. GroundUp 22 January [WWW 
document]. URL https://www.groundup.org.za/article/
how-severe-drought-detailed-look-data/ (accessed 5 
February 2020).
Yates, J.S. and L.M. Harris (2018) Hybrid regulatory 
landscapes: the human right to water, variegated 
neoliberal water governance, and policy transfer in 
Cape Town, South Africa, and Accra, Ghana. World 
Development 110 (October), 75–87.
Ziervogel, G. (2019) Unpacking the Cape Town drought: 
lessons learned. Report for Cities Support Programme, 
undertaken by the African Centre for Cities [WWW 
document]. URL https://www.africancentreforcities.
net/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Ziervogel-2019-
Lessons-from-Cape-Town-Drought_A.pdf (accessed 4 
July 2019).
